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Evaluation of agricultural programs  in terms of economic  criteria
is  a  complex  and  difficult  problem.  Such  an  evaluation  can  be
based  on  intuition,  theory,  formal  economic  models,  or  experience.
My  evaluation  will  be based  largely  on  the  experience  of  the  last
decade buttressed with some results  of formal models  developed  by
others.
For  evaluation  of  political  feasibility,  it  seems  to  me  that  we
are forced to rely on either intuition or experience.  I have little faith
in the reliability of my intuition regarding the politics of agriculture,
and  even  less  faith  in  the  apparent  intuition  of  some  of  our  most
prominent  political  leaders.  Therefore,  I  will rely heavily upon his-
tory  as a guide in judging political feasibility,  but I will weight  that
history  with an  evaluation  of the  changing  facts  of  political  life.
The criteria of political feasibility for farm programs are increas-
ingly dependent upon the program's  ability  to pass  successfully  the
tests  of  several  other  criteria-two  of  which  are  its  effects  upon
economic growth and its effects  upon foreign trade. Also, some other
important criteria  must be  considered.
I believe  it  is  fitting to focus  our attention  upon  the  two  issues
of  growth and  trade because  these  two criteria  are,  in my  opinion,
becoming  increasingly  important.  Farm  programs  have  long  been
subject to scrutiny on the basis of their contribution  to farm income,
equal opportunity  for farm  people,  general  economic  stability,  and
freedom  of  farm  operators.  You  will  notice  that  these  particular
values  largely  are those of prime  importance  to farm people.
Economic  growth  has  been  an  implicit  goal  underlying  United
States economic policy for many decades, but its relative  importance
was  submerged by problems  of income  level,  income stability,  and
income  distribution  during  the  1930's.  It  was  again  submerged  by
the  problems  of  war  and  postwar  adjustments.  Since  about  1950,
however,  increased  emphasis  has  been  given  to  economic  growth.
Moreover,  the  distribution  of  the  benefits  and  burdens  of  growth
has  been  of increasing  concern,  especially  in  agricultural  policy.
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gory  since  it is  regarded  as  desirable  because  it will  achieve  other
values we believe to be good; it is not generally  regarded  as  an end
in  itself.  Foreign  trade  is  regarded  as  desirable  because  it:  (1) in-
creases  the  efficiency  of  international  resource  use,  (2)  improves
international  relations  and  thereby  international  political  stability,
(3)  brings higher  income  to  U.  S. producers,  and  (4)  contributes  to
economic  growth.
ANALYTICAL  FRAMEWORK
In examining  the basic interrelations  that I believe useful to  con-
sider,  we  must recognize  three  factors:
First,  in general,  we  in our  society  hold certain  values,  or  con-
ditions or  qualities  we think  are  desirable.  Economic  growth is  one
such  value  and  it  has  increased  in  relative  importance  in  recent
decades,  perhaps  because  other values  (such  as  economic  stability)
are more nearly satisfied.
Second,  economic  policies  are  designed  to  bring the  real world
closer to our aspirations.  A  policy which  promises  to  achieve  many
aspirations  will  receive  more  support than a policy  which  promises
to  achieve  only  one.  Freer  international  trade  is  one  such  policy
which  appears  capable  of  achieving  several  aspirations.
Third,  political  feasibility  depends  upon  whether  the  relevant
power groups  in the political process  are convinced that a particular
program  will achieve  the values  that they consider  desirable.  Politi-
cal feasibility may change if the underlying values in society change,
or if people's opinions  regarding the ability  of a program to "deliver
the goods"  change,  or  if  the political  power  structure  changes.  My
thesis  is that the last two items  have changed  significantly  over  the
past few years,  narrowing the limits  of farm policy.
With this  analytical framework  in mind  let us examine  some  of
the  broad  policies  in  agriculture,  largely  leaving  the  commodity
details to the speakers  who follow.
RECENT  EXPERIENCE
Domestic Programs
The  postwar  experience  in  farm  programs  has  been  that  of
learning  new facts-the  hard  way.  One by  one  some  of  the  beliefs
underpinning our farm programs  have been changed  by the  results
of experience and analysis.  Consequently, the  limits of United States
farm policy have been narrowed,  and they are likely to be narrowed
even further.
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mercial  agriculture  can  prosper  in  a  market  completely  free  of
government  intervention  in  the  immediate  future.  Sliding  farm
incomes  combined  with  economic  analysis  removed  this  belief
from  all  but  a  few  of  the  most  nostalgic  minds.  Even  the  much
castigated  CED report  on  agriculture  recommended  major  govern-
mental programs  to forestall the economic  consequences  of a return
to free markets,  and the outcry over  the report  was  largely because
it suggested  the ending  of  government  intervention  in  commodity
prices at some future  time.
Unfortunately for the policy  makers, at the same time  it became
obvious  that merely abandoning  government price  programs  would
not solve farm income  problems,  it also  was  becoming obvious  that
other  programs  were  not  solving  them,  or  if  they  would,  only  at
the expense of other important values in our economy.
By the beginning of the  1960's,  it had  become  increasingly  clear
that the public expenditures  to produce  and  store farm products  of
little  or  no  economic  value  at home  or  abroad  might represent  a
reduction  in  potential  economic  growth  in  the  economy.  The
burgeoning  budget  costs  of  farm  programs  represented  the  cost
of  producing  and  storing  excess  farm  products  of  relatively  low
value  when  the  resources  could  be  used  instead  to  produce  other
goods  more  preferred  by  consumers.  Using  tax  money  to  pay  for
farm products to add to an already excessive  stock of farm products
makes  little  sense  to  most  people.  Most  economists  would  argue
that government  expenditures  for a number of  other purposes  have
a higher potential for  expanding  the growth of  the  economy.  Since
the  total  size  of  the federal  budget  at  any  one  time  has  practical
political limits,  costly  farm programs  in  essence  mean  less  govern-
ment  expenditures  on  something  else  which  could  contribute  to
greater economic  growth.
The  second  widely  held  belief  about  farm  programs  that  has
come  under  fire in  recent years  is  the belief  that  a moderate-level
price-support  program  for  major  commodities  could  be  operated
without  major  output  control and  without  large  budget  costs  and
surplus  accumulation.  This  belief  was  shattered  as  the  mounting
stocks  and  mounting  budget  costs  followed  in  successive  waves
year after year.
Then  came  a  series  of  soil-bank  programs,  which  were  merely
devices  to  reward  some  resources  more  for  remaining  idle  than
they could earn in use.  Paying for resources  to remain idle is hardly
consistent with maximum  growth  in any  economy,  although  it may
be  preferable  to  the  income  problem  that  would  have  followed
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followed higher supports and no effective controls.
The present  administration,  when  it  took office  in  1961,  shared
none  of  these  earlier  beliefs-perhaps  in  part  because  some  of  its
members had been instrumental in changing them. They recognized
clearly  that  chronic  surpluses  and  huge  budget  expenditures  for
farm  programs  were  not  consistent  with  maximum  growth  and,
moreover,  that  free  prices  would  be  inconsistent  with  the  values
relating  to  income  in  agriculture.  Given  this  insight,  which  their
predecessors  had lacked,  they promptly  embarked upon  a  program
of  higher  domestic  prices-to  be  achieved  by  effective  quantity
controls  on production-and  large-scale  surplus  disposal  programs
abroad.  The administration  judged, and correctly, I believe,  that the
day was  approaching  when  the previous  type programs,  with their
chronic stock accumulation  and rising budget  costs would no longer
be  politically  feasible  in  view  of  an  increasingly  urban  Congress
and  other  high priority  claims  upon  limited  government  resources.
While  the  administration's  judgment  regarding  congressional
political feasibility  undoubtedly  was  correct  and remains  so,  it was
badly  in  error  regarding  the  political  feasibility  of  their  program
among  farmers.  One  of  the unique  features  of  farm  programs  has
been  the  right of farmers  to vote  directly  on  the  control aspects  of
the programs  in  addition  to their  right  to  react  through  the  usual
political channels of voluntary farm organizations.
The  administration's  program  of  higher  supports  and  effective
controls  did  not  even  make  it  through  Congress  in  1961,  and  the
administration  was  forced  to  settle  for  temporary  programs  similar
to those  used by their predecessors.  In  1962  only a wheat  program
was salvaged from the original package,  and this was  soundly voted
down  by  wheat  producers  in  May  1963-proving  that  political
feasibility  in farm policy is a major problem.
Foreign Trade
Meanwhile  the  passing  of  time  has  once  again  brought  us  ex-
perience  that  changes  our  beliefs  about  the  outcomes  of  certain
actions  in  the  area  of  foreign  trade.
Price-support  programs  were  born  in  the  1930's  when  foreign
trade in all products was at a low  ebb.  During the war and postwar
period  the  relative  importance  of foreign  markets  for  our products
diminished.  Moreover,  it looked as if foreign  countries never would
really be able  to produce  many goods  U.  S. consumers  would want
to buy.  Indeed,  during the early postwar  period  as much time  was
spent in monetary policy seminars analyzing the  reasons underlying
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spent discussing the chronic dollar surpluses and the resulting  U.  S.
balance-of-payments  problem.  This  early  postwar  climate  contrib-
uted  to  the  development  of  agricultural  programs  with  little
or no regard for their foreign trade implications.
Suddenly  in the mid-1950's the impact  of our domestic  programs
upon  foreign  trade  in  farm  products  came  home  to  roost  with  a
vengeance.  Exports  of farm products  fell precipitously,  aggravating
the domestic  stocks  problem  and threatening  us with  a  permanent
loss  of foreign markets  as foreign supplies  expanded  to fill  the  gap.
Farm  policy  makers  suddenly  found  that  foreign  trade  in  farm
products  was  important  to farm  income  and  that to  fill the  gap  in
farm  income  if  foreign  markets  were  lost  would  require  massive
budget expenditures.  Thus, we  embarked upon  a patchwork  policy
of  multiple price  plans,  export  subsidies,  etc.,  none  of  which  were
consistent  with  the  ideals  of  free  foreign  trade,  but  which  did  in
fact expand foreign sales.
About  this  time,  however,  external  events  began  to  work  in
ways  which  increasingly  limit  the  alternatives  available  to  U.  S.
farm  policy  makers.  First,  the  U.  S. suddenly  found  itself  with  a
chronic  balance-of-payments  problem,  a  problem  so  serious  that
corrective  action  was  necessary.  Part  of  this  corrective  action  has
undoubtedly  operated  as  a  brake  on  domestic  employment  and
growth rates.  Also, farm products were  belatedly  recognized  as  one
of  our largest  export  items  that might help  improve  our payments
position.  In  order  to  sell  farm  products  abroad  for  dollars,  our
domestic agricultural policies must be consistent with and conducive
to  trade  with  foreign  countries.  Moreover,  in  this  game  of  selling
more  U.  S.  products  abroad-especially  farm  products-we  now
find  ourselves  facing  a  group  of  bargainers  who  are  completely
aware  of  our  weaknesses  and  are  quite  willing  to  exploit  them.
Above  all,  they  are  demanding  increasingly  that  our  policies  be
subject  to  the  same  rules  as  everyone  else's,  and  this  puts  a  new
dimension on political feasibility.
Some  of the rules that foreign countries want to apply in foreign
trade  include:  (1) no  export  subsidies  or  export  dumping,  (2)  no
tariffs  or quotas  on imports  of competing  products,  and  (3)  no  sub-
sidization of production in order to maintain artificially low domestic
prices.  These  were  the  agricultural  policy  issues  that  were  instru-
mental  in barring  British  entry  to  the  Common  Market,  and  they
are  the  issues  that  most  certainly  will  make  our  negotiations  in
agriculture difficult.
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It  thus  appears  that  we  may  draw  some  general  conclusions
regarding  the limits  on farm policy.  First,  unlimited  price  supports
at  high  levels  have  about  reached  the  end  of  their  political  and
economic  feasibility.  The budget  costs  are too  high, the impacts  on
trade are  adverse,  and as  a result  commodity programs  of  this  type
are almost universally in difficulty.
Second,  with few  exceptions  the possibility  of  obtaining  farmer
agreement  for  effective  nonvoluntary  output  control programs  (re-
quired  to  maintain  high  domestic  price  supports  without  large
budget expenditures)  appears to be very low.  Even if farmer agree-
ment were forthcoming,  the problems  might  be  great  inasmuch  as
the  high  domestic  price  levels  would  get  us  into  trade  difficulties
both on the import and export side.
Third,  budget  costs  and  the  reactions  of  rural  farm-associated
businesses  will probably  put rather  definite  limits  on  the  size  and
effectiveness  of a program of output control through land retirement.
The  slippage  in  such  a program  is  very  great  if the  price  level  is
relatively  high.  Thus,  price  goals will have  to be  relatively  modest
if this approach is to be used.
Despite  the  rather  strong  political  reaction  among  many  farm
groups,  the  movement  is  toward  the  use  of  some  kind  of  limited
payments  program  which  will  maintain  farm  income  without  the
adverse effects  previously mentioned.  The trend  is already  clear  for
several  commodities  and  others  may  follow.  This  approach  is  ap-
pealing because  it will improve  our international  trade position  and
because  the budget costs  can  be limited in a variety  of ways.  Even
the two-price  plan for wheat that was voted down was in this direc-
tion,  and many of the substitutes being offered  are even  more  so.
Thus, the  limits  of acceptability  of farm  programs  appear  to  be
narrowing  as  time  passes.  Complete  abandonment  of  government
intervention  in agriculture  would be  unacceptable  to  a majority  of
farmers.  Neither would most nonfarm  groups view this as the desir-
able  way  to  remove  the  frustrations  resulting  from  the  present
programs.  If,  however,  powerful  groups  in  agriculture  fail  to
recognize  the new  dimensions  of farm  policy  and  effectively  block
new approaches, this may be the alternative  that prevails by default.
The  political  feasibility  of  farm  programs  now  depends  upon
three  levels  of  acceptance.  The  first  level  is  the  farmer-producers
themselves.  This  has  always  been  true,  and  farmers'  ideas  of  what
is  acceptable  do  not  appear  to  have  changed  drastically  from  the
past.  The  second  is  nonfarm  politicians,  who  clearly  are  in  the
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government.  The  third  is  foreign  governments,  which  are  in  turn
representing  the interests  of  their producers  and consumers.
Historically,  farm  policy  has  been  formulated  almost  entirely
with  regard  to  political  feasibility  among  U.  S.  farm  producers-
with  an occasional  bow to  the  U.  S. nonfarm  public.  Increasingly,
however,  the  political  feasibility  of  a  program  in  terms  of  the
second  and  third groups  is  being  considered.  In fact,  no  farm  pro-
gram  can  now  be  approved  in  the  United  States  without  at  least
the  tacit  approval  of  nonfarm  political  forces.  Given  the  present
and probable future  international  position  of the United  States, the
importance  of a program's  political  feasibility  in  terms  of  the  third
group-foreign  governments-is  bound  to  increase.  This means  that
farmers  may  well  find  themselves  forced  to  choose  from  a  series
of  unpleasant  policy  alternatives-a  situation  which  loomed  large
in the wheat referendum.  Even so,  farm leaders  must recognize  the
new  dimensions  of  political  feasibility  which  they  will  have  to
accept  as  the  U.  S. and  the  world  economies  and  political  power
change.
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